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NOTES
Employment Discrimination Claims Under ERISA Section
510: Should Courts Require Exhaustion of Arbitral and
Plan Remedies?

Jared A. Goldstein
!Nrn.ODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) 1 regulates employer-sponsored welfare and pension
plans2 in two distinct ways. Frrst, it requires plan administrators to
provide benefits according to the terms of the plans. If a plan administrator wrongfully denies a benefit guaranteed by the plan, the
beneficiary can sue in federal court to recover the benefit.3 Courts
refer to such claims as "benefits claims."4 These claims amount to
breach-of-contract actions and require courts to construe the terms
of BRISA-governed plans in order to determine whether the plan
owes the plaintiff benefits.5
,
Second, BRISA establishes minimum standards to govern plans
and the actions of plan fiduciaries. Minimum standards established
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988) and in scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1988)).
2. ERISA defines two types of plans covered by the Act. Employee welfare benefit plans
or "welfare plans" include plans that provide "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits,
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1988). Employee pension benefit plans or
"pension plans" are those plans that "provide[] retirement income to employees, or .•.
result[] in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of
covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988).
3. ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B) provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988). In addition, ERISA § 404(a) establishes that plan fiduciaries must adhere to plan documents: "A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (1988).
4. See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1017, 1027 (4th Cir. 1993); Horan v.
Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1991); McMahan v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1989); Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d
1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989).
5. Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that ERISA
§§ 502(a)(l)(B) and 514(a) preempt a state breach-of-contract action based on a violation of
the terms of a plan).
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by BRISA include vesting schedules that pension plans must meet6
and broad fiduciary obligations to which plan administrators must
adhere.7 BRISA provides plan participants and beneficiaries a federal cause of action to enforce these standards.8 Courts characterize such claims as "statutory claims," 9 which require courts to
interpret the provisions of BRISA itself.10
. BRISA section 510,11 the subject of this Note, provides one of
the statutory rights guaranteed by BRISA. Section 510 prohibits
employers both from discriminating against an employee on the basis of her eligibility for benefits and from retaliating against an employee for asserting her rights under BRISA:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan [or] this title ... or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may
become entitled under the plan [or this title]. 12

Section 510 amounts to antidiscrimination legislation. One court
has analogized the protection offered by section 510 to that offered
by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:13 "As Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race with respect to such employment, so does section 510 prohibit discrimination with respect to
pension benefits on the basis of one's proximity to such benefits. " 14
6. ERISA § 203 requires pension plans to provide participants a nonforfeitable right to
their accrued benefits after no more than seven years. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988).
7. These obligations include the requirements that fiduciaries perform their duties in accordance with the "prudent man" standard of trust law, that fiduciaries act for the exclusive
benefit of participants and beneficiaries, and that fiduciaries act in accordance with plan documents. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
8. ERISA § 502(a}(3) provides a cause of action to a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
"(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter ... or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a}(3} (1988).
9. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 665 (2d Cir. 1994); Amaro v. Continental
Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1984} ("This statutory claim is not for benefits under a
collective bargaining agreement." (emphasis added)}; Air Line Pilots Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, 627 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
10. See Amaro, 724 F.2d at 751 ("We are faced solely with an alleged violation of a pro·
tection afforded by ERISA ... [T)here is only a statute to interpret."); Kross v. Western
Elec. Co., 701F.2d1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1983) ("It is clear from the language of§ 502(a) •••
that § 502(a)(l) encompasses civil actions for violations of the terms of a benefit plan, while
§ 502(a)(3} authorizes civil actions for violations of the provisions of ERISA itself.").
11. 29 u.s.c. § 1140 (1988).
12. 29 u.s.c. § 1140 (1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
14. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting McLendon
v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1503-04 (D.NJ. 1985)); see also EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS COMM., ABA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 529 (1991) ("Section 510 of ERISA is an
antidiscrimination in employment and antiretaliation statute similar in concept to the
ADEA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act.").
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Unlike Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
personal characteristics such as race, religion, and sex, section 510
explicitly prohibits employers from discriminating for purely economic reasons.15 For instance, one employee e~tablished a prima
facie case of discrimination under section 510 by showing that her
employer fired her in order to prevent her from becoming eligible
for .substantial disability benefits.16 In another case, an employee
established a prima facie case of a section 510 violation by showing
that his employer discharged him to prevent him from qualifying
for an additional $550,000 in pension benefits.17
Although BRISA provides a federal cause of action to enforce
section 510, BRISA-governed plans themselves may provide a private mechanism for reviewing the actions of plan administrators.18
Additionally, employment contracts and collective bargaining
agreements frequently specify private arbitration as the exclusive
means for handling employment disputes.19 In the context of plan
remedies, courts typically defer to the determinations of plan adIn analyzing § 510 claims, courts often explicitly apply Title VII principles in allocating
burdens of proof. Thus, as in a Title VII claim, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Dister v. Continental Group, Inc. 859 F.2d 1108,
1111-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-53 (1981)); Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer then must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory action. 859 F.2d
at 1112; 812 F.2d at 853. If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then attempt to
show that the employer's decision was based on an unlawful motive, either through direct
evidence of discrimination or by proving that the employer's articulated reason is unworthy
of credence. 859 F.2d at 1112; 812 F.2d at 853.
15. Another important distinction between § 510 and Title VII is that, unlike Title VII,
ERISA preempts otherwise applicable state law. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); see IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (holding that ERISA § 510 preempts a state
wrongful discharge claim). Thus, § 510 offers employees their only protection against actions
by their employers - including firing - intended to prevent employees from obtaining pension, disability, or other benefits under employer-sponsored plans.
16. See Zipf v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 891-93 (3d Cir. 1986).
17. Dister, 859 F.2d at 1114-15. Although the typical § 510 case alleges wrongful discharge, other employer actions may also give rise to a successful § 510 claim. For instance, an
employee stated a § 510 claim in alleging that his employer fraudulently induced him to
waive his rights to benefits under the employer's pension plan. See Healy v. Axelrod Constr.
Co. Defined Benefit Pension Plan & Trust, 787 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
18. See BRISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988) (requiring plans to include a procedure for
appealing denials of benefits); infra notes 39, 70-73 and accompanying text.
19. In 1975, the Department of Labor estimated that 96.1 % of collective bargaining
agreements included a grievance and arbitration system. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CHARACrERISTICS OF MAJOR CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, JULY 1, 1975, tbls. 8.1-8.2 (1977). An extensive 1989 survey found that 98% of sample contracts contained arbitration provisions. See BUREAU OF NATL. AFFAIRS, BASIC
PATTERNS JN UNION CoNTRAcrs 37 (12th ed. 1989) [hereinafter BNA, BASIC PATTERNS].
Although the Department of Labor does not maintain comparable statistics for individual
employment contracts, arbitration agreements may be becoming increasingly prevalent for
individual employees. See Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at Al ("Prompted largely by fears that federal juries will
grant large monetary awards in bias cases, more and more companies are requiring their
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ministrators, upholding their conclusions unless they are "arbitrary
and capricious."2° Courts review the decisions of private arbitrators
with even greater deference, upholding arbitral decisions unless the
award is "completely irrational or evidences a 'manifest disregard
for law' " 2 1 or the arbitrator exceeds the scope of her authority.22
Federal courts disagree over whether to require plaintiffs to exhaust private dispute mechanisms before bringing section 510
claims to court. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits generally require section 510 claimants to exhaust the appeal procedures
provided by BRISA-governed plans before they may sue in federal
court.23 The Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand,
have held that the text and legislative history of BRISA do not provide evidence of a congressional intent to require exhaustion of
plan remedies.24 The courts also disagree over whether plaintiffs
must exhaust arbitral remedies.25 The Ninth Circuit has held that
section 510 claims are not subject to otherwise valid arbitration
clauses on the grounds that only the federal judiciary can enforce
the rights protected by section 510.26 The Second, Third, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits have concluded otherwise and have upheld
employees to submit claims of discrimination, including sexual harassment, to binding
arbitration.").
20. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-15 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that courts should review discretionary decisions of plan administrators under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.
21. Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1993).
22. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 594, 597 (1960).
23. See Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA statutory claims are generally subject to an exhaustion requirement, although an exception to the
requirement applied in the instant case); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219,
1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cerl denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d
1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1983).
24. See Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990);
Zipfv. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986); Amaro v. Continental Can Co. 724 F.2d 747 {9th
Cir. 1984).
25. In some ways, it may be misleading to refer to the issue of whether plaintiffs must
arbitrate § 510 claims as an issue of exhaustion. Exhaustion typically refers to whether a
claimant must seek review before resorting to court. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying
text. In contrast, when an arbitration agreement covers a claim, claimants must usually resort
to the arbitral forum instead of going to court. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."). Perhaps partly because limited
judicial review of arbitral decisions is available in court, however, courts tend to discuss the
issue as one of exhaustion. See, e.g., Mason, 763 F.2d at 1222; Amaro, 124 F.2d at 750. Moreover, exhaustion in this context also refers to the situation in which courts require plaintiffs to
pursue arbitration of contract disputes before bringing claims for statutory ERISA violations.
See 724 F.2d at 752 ("A trial court can stay any statutory claim that arises out of substantially
the same facts present in an ongoing administrative or arbitral proceeding.").
26. See 724 F.2d at 750-51.
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arbitration agreements covering statutory BRISA claims such as
section 510 claims.21
This Note examines whether courts should require section 510
claimants to exhaust either plan-based or arbitral remedies before
seeking judicial relief. It begins by comparing the basis for an exhaustion requirement with respect to benefits claims with the basis
for such a requirement with respect to statutory claims - like those
under section 510. Part I examines the rationale courts have offered for requiring exhaustion of plan remedies for benefits claims.
Part I concludes that federal courts have correctly determined that
Congress intended individuals bringing benefits claims to exhaust
the remedies provided by the plan before seeking judicial relief.
Part II argues, however, that courts should not impose an exhaustion of plan remedies requirement for statutory claims such as section 510 claims because neither the text nor the legislative history of
BRISA indicates that Congress intended to require exhaustion for
statutory claims. Part II further argues that even if courts generally
apply an exhaustion requirement to statutory BRISA claims, they
should waive this requirement for most claims brought under section 510 by applying the judicially recognized exceptions to exhaustion for futility and inadequate remedies.
Having determined that BRISA does not require exhaustion of
plan-based remedies before plaintiffs may bring section 510 claims,
this Note then turns to the related issue of whether courts should
require section 510 claimants to exhaust contractually agreed-upon
arbitral remedies. Part III argues that under recent Supreme Court
decisions the determination of whether section 510 claims are subject to arbitration depends on whether the arbitration agreement is
governed by the Labor Management Relations Act or the Federal
Arbitration Act. This determination, in tum, depends on the type
of contract containing the arbitration agreement - whether the arbitration agreement appears in a collective bargaining agreement, a
commercial contract, or an individual employment contract. Part
III then concludes that under relevant Supreme Court precedent
courts should not require those bringing a section 510 claim to exhaust arbitration specified by a collective bargaining agreement.
Courts should, however, require exhaustion of arbitral remedies
when the arbitration agreement is found in an individual employment contract or a commercial contract.
27. See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that, in general, ERISA statutory claims are subject to arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1991) (same); Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir.
1988) (same); Mason, 763 F.2d at 1224 (holding that ERISA claims are subject to arbitration
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement).
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OF REMEDIES REQUIREMENT

All courts agree that those seeking to recover wrongfully denied
benefits must exhaust the appeals procedures provided by the plan
before bringing suit in federal court.28 Some courts have expanded
the reach of the exhaustion requirement beyond these benefits
claims and apply it also to statutory claims.29 These courts find that
the rationale for requiring exhaustion in the context of benefits
claims applies to all ERISA claims, including section 510 claims.3o
This Part examines the rationale for applying an exhaustion of remedies requirement to benefits claims in order to set the stage for a
similar analysis of statutory claims in Part II. Section I.A explores
the development of the exhaustion requirement in the context of
benefits claims. Section I.B describes another aspect of exhaustion
doctrine, the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement.
This Part provides the framework that will be employed in Part II
to determine whether the rationale for requiring exhaustion in the
context of benefits claims applies in the section 510 context as well.
A. Foundation of the Exhaustion Requirement

In the federal labor law context, courts have applied an exhaustion of remedies requirement as a means of accommodating two
potentially conflicting policies - providing access to the courts and
encouraging private resolution of disputes. On the one hand, section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA)31 provides a federal cause of action to those claiming a
violation of a collective bargaining agreement.32 On the other
28. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CoMM., ABA, supra note 14, at 498 {"In general, a participant or beneficiary may not bring an action in state or federal court under Section
502{a){l)(B) for benefits under the plan unless he has first exhausted the plan's internal
claims procedure, including appeals."); James S. Ray, Overview of ER/SA Title I Enforce·
ment: Procedural Aspects, in ALI-ABA CouRSE OF Sroov: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LmoATION 385, 417 {1994); Whitman F. Manley, Note, Civil Actions Under ER/SA Section 502(a):
When Should Courts Require That Claimants Exhaust Arbitral or Intraftmd Remedies?, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 952, 958 (1986) {"Courts uniformly hold that the failure of a participant to
exhaust internal review procedures when challenging a benefit denial under the terms of a
benefit plan will bar his subsequent suit under ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B).").
29. See Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the exhaustion doctrine applies to a claim under ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1988),
which prohibits employers from amending pension plans to eliminate or decrease early retirement benefits or subsidies); Mason, 763 F.2d at 1227 {holding that the exhaustion requirement applies to statutory ERISA claims); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244
(7th Cir. 1983) (same).
30. See 763 F.2d at 1227 ("[I]mposing an exhaustion requirement [for ERISA statutory
claims] appears to be consistent with the intent of Congress that pension plans provide intrafund review procedures."); 701 F.2d at 1245 (concluding that "well-established federal policy, and supporting case law, favoring exhaustion of administrative remedies" applies to
statutory claims as well as benefits claims).
31. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1988).
32. LMRA § 301(a) provides:
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hand, LMRA section 203(d) establishes a policy of encouraging the
development of private grievance procedures to settle workplace
disputes.33 In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 34 the Supreme Court
resolved the tension inherent in these provisions .by requiring those
claiming a violation of a collective bargaining agreement to exhaust
the agreement's grievance procedure before bringing a federal
cause of action.3s
Like the LMRA, BRISA provides access to courts but also encourages private resolution of disputes. BRISA itself declares that
one of its primary purposes is to provide participants and beneficiaries "ready access to the Federal courts."36 Section 502(a)(l)(B)
helps implement this goal by creating a cause of action for plan participants and beneficiaries to recover wrongfully denied benefits.37
Standing alone, section 502(a)(l)(B) creates no special procedural
barriers for those bringing a claim for benefits. BRISA section 503,
however, requires plans to include an internal procedure for reviewing denials of benefits.38 In contrast to section 502(a)(l)(B),
section 503 expressly anticipates private dispute resolution. Nothing in the text of BRISA indi~ates how, or if, Congress intended
these two provisions to work together. Applying a doctrine that
developed in labor law, courts have resolved this apparent tension
by requiring those seeking benefits to exhaust plan remedies before
bringing suit.39
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
33. LMRA § 203(d} states: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d} (1988).
34. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
35. 379 U.S. at 652 ("As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor
policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt
use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of
redress.").
36. 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(b} (1988).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988).
38. Under § 503, all plans must establish procedures that "afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by
the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim." 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988).
39. In Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980), the court decided to follow "[t]he
usual rule in the field of labor law":
[W]here administrative procedures have been instituted for the resolution of disputes
between parties to a collectively bargained or other agreement, the courts will generally
require the exhaustion of those procedures before exercising the jurisdiction they might
otherwise have over disputes subject to resolution through said procedures.
618 F.2d at 566; see Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1991); Springer v.
Wal-Mart Assocs.' Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1990); Leonelli v.
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BRISA's requirement that plans include an appeals procedure
implies a congressional understanding that those bringing benefits
claims in federal court would first resort to the plan procedures. As
the courts have noted, section 503 was "intended by Congress to
help reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits under BRISA; to promote the consistent treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a
nonadversarial method of claims settlement; and to minimize the
costs of claims settlement for all concerned. "40 Plan remedies
would not fulfill these purposes if claimants could avoid the procedure by going directly to court. As the Ninth Circuit stated: "It
would certainly be anomalous if the same good reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered plans to
provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not
lead courts to see that those remedies are regularly used. "41
The legislative history of BRISA further demonstrates a congressional intent to require exhaustion for benefits claims. The conference report accompanying BRISA declares that in adjudicating
benefits claims courts should follow the procedures established for
LMRA section 301.42 As noted above, the Supreme Court has read
section 301 of the LMRA to require exhaustion of the grievance
procedures furnished by a collective bargaining agreement.43 Thus,
the conference report suggests that, just as section 301 requires the
exhaustion of collective bargaining agreement grievance procedures, so too does BRISA require exhaustion of plan remedies
before a plaintiff can bring a benefits claim in federal court.44
An exhaustion requirement for benefits claims also appears to
comport with the purposes of BRISA. The legislative history indicates that Congress sought to provide a means of resolving questions of benefits eligibility quickly and cheaply: "The [Senate
Finance Committee] believes that all workers and plan beneficiaries
should have the opportunity to resolve any controversy over their
Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989); Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80,
82 (4th Cir. 1989); Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300-02 (5th Cir. 1985); Wolf v.
National Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. Teamsters Local 705 Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM.,
ABA, supra note 14, at 498 (stating that the exhaustion requirement "is not found in the
statute; instead, it has been created and uniformly accepted by the federal courts and has its
roots in ERISA's legislative history and federal labor law").
40. Amato, 618 F.2d at 567; see Makar, 872 F.2d at 83; Denton, 765 F.2d at 1301; Mason v.
Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087
(1986); Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1983).
41. Amato, 618 F.2d at 567; see also Makar, 872 F.2d at 83; Denton, 765 F.2d at 1301;
Mason, 763 F.2d at 1227; Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245; Manley, supra note 28, at 967.
42. The report states that courts should treat § 502 claims "in similar fashion to those
brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." H.R. CoNP.
REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107.
43. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
44. See Amato, 618 F.2d at 567.
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retirement benefits under qualified plans in an inexpensive and expeditious manner." 45 Another committee indicated its desire to
minimize the number of frivolous benefits suits.46 Federal courts
have concluded that imposing a requirement that benefits claimants
exhaust plan remedies serves these purposes.4 7 Plan procedures reduce expenses by avoiding many of the costs associated with litigation, such as filing fees and attorney's fees. In addition, an
exhaustion requirement ensures that the cheap and quick remedy
provided by plan procedures will be used.48 At the same time, requiring exhaustion helps reduce frivolous lawsuits by weeding out
unmeritorious claims at an early stage.49 Imposing _an exhaustion
requirement also helps courts minimize frivolous suits by creating a
more complete factual record for those benefits claims that do
reach federal court.so
Requiring exhaustion for benefits claims also serves ERISA's
purposes by promoting the expertise of plan administrators in managing BRISA-governed plans.51 The exhaustion requirement gives
plan administrators the primary responsibility for determining eligibility for benefits. Determining and reviewing benefits eligibility
45. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,

5000.
46. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4682.
47. Amato, 618 F.2d at 567; see Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir.
1989); Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1985); Mason v. Continental
Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986); Kross v.
Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1983).
48. Fiduciaries ordinarily must review appeals of benefit denials within 60 days after the
filing of the appeal. Department of Labor regulations implementing § 503 state:
A decision by an appropriate named fiduciary shall be made promptly, and shall not
ordinarily be made later than 60 days after the plan's receipt of a request for review,
unless special circumstances (such as the need to hold a hearing, if the plan procedure
provides for a hearing) require an extension of time for processing, in which case a
decision shall be rendered as soon as possible, but not later than 120 days after receipt of
a request for review.
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(h) (1993).
49. Because courts typically defer to plan administrators' decisions, see supra note 20 and
accompanying text, plaintiffs should be less willing to incur the expense of litigation to dispute an adverse decision.
50. In Amato, the Ninth Circuit concluded:
Finally, a primary reason for the exhaustion requirement •.. is that prior fully considered actions by pension plan trustees interpreting their plans and perhaps also further
refining and defining the problem in given cases, may well assist the courts when they
are called upon to resolve the controversies.
618 F.2d at 568. This reasoning has been cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Mason, 763 F.2d at
1227, and by the Seventh Circuit in Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245.
51. See, e.g., 618 F.2d at 567 ("Moreover, the trustees of covered benefit plans are
granted broad fiduciary rights and responsibilities under ERISA, •.. and implementation of
the exhaustion requirement will enhance their ability to expertly and efficiently manage their
funds by preventing premature judicial intervention in their decision-making processes.").

202

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:193

requires fiduciaries to interpret the terms of the plan, which perhaps improves their familiarity with plan details.52
The text, history, and purposes of BRISA thus suggest that exhaustion of plan remedies for benefits claims is a sensible requirement. The next section considers two exceptions to the rule.
·
B. Exceptions to Exhaustion
Although the exhaustion requirement mandates that claimants
ordinarily should employ plan remedies before bringing suit, courts
have created two exceptions to the requirement. Under these exceptions, district courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when resort to plan procedures would be "futile" or
when the plan procedures provide "inadequate remedies."53 As
with the exhaustion requirement itself, these exceptions are derived
from labor law precedent.54
In the context of BRISA benefits claims, the futility exception
allows a court to waive the exhaustion requirement if the court concludes that reliance on a plan's internal claims procedure would be
unavailing, unsuccessful, or a waste of time.ss Plaintiffs can demonstrate futility, for example, by showing that plan administrators
have unequivocally stated that they are not entitled to benefits.s6
Courts have also indicated that the exhaustion requirement inay be
excused for futility when a plan administrator has displayed hostility or personal bias against the plaintiff.57 Finally, a plaintiff can
52. See 618 F.2d at 567.
53. See, e.g., Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 160 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that "an
exception should be recognized for pleading impossibility of exhaustion in cases where claims
procedures prove futile"); Amato, 618 F.2d at 568 (" 'There are occasions when a court is
obliged to exercise its jurisdiction and is guilty of an abuse of discretion if it does not, the
most familiar examples perhaps being when resort to the administrative route is futile or the
remedy inadequate.'" (quoting Winterberger v. General Teamsters Auto 'Ihlck Drivers &
Helpers Local Union 162, 558 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1977))); see also Ray, supra note 28, at
421-22.
54. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 685 (1981) (holding that the inadequate remedies
exception applies to cases brought under LMRA § 301); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393
U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969) (holding that the futility exception applies to LMRA § 301 cases).
55. See Ludwig v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 838 F. Supp. 769, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) {"The 'futility doctrine' is perhaps best understood as a term of art that considers whether, in light of
both the claimant's and the plan administrator's actions, it is fair to require the dismissal of
the claimant's suit pending her reapplication for benefits in accordance with the procedures
set forth in the summary plan description.'').
56. See Horan v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991).
57. Cf. Denton v. Frrst Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1985) {holding that without a showing of hostility or bitterness on the part of plan administrators, the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate futility); Amato, 618 F.2d at 569 (holding that the plaintiff failed to show
futility because he had not clearly proven that plan administrators exhibited personal bias
against him).
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demonstrate futility by showing that she had no meaningful access
to plan procedures.ss
The inadequate remedies exception to the exhaustion requirement applies when the remedies available under the private procedures would not compensate the plaintiff for the injuries she claims
to have suffered. In the labor law context, the Supreme Court has
held that exhaustion of collectively bargained procedures is not required when those procedures would not provide the "complete relief" available in court.59 Courts have indicated that this exception
to the exhaustion requirement may be available in the BRISA context as well.60
These two exceptions are part and parcel of the exhaustion requirement for benefits claims under BRISA. The next Part examines how this requirement, including its two exceptions, should
apply to BRISA statutory claims.

II. THE

INAPPLICABILITY OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
TO SECTION 510 CLAIMS

The previous Part demonstrated that those bringing benefits
claims must exhaust plan procedures. The application of the exhaustion requirement to statutory BRISA claims, however, remains
an open question. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits infer from
the evidence indicating a congressional intent to require exhaustion
for benefits claims a general intent to require exhaustion for most
BRISA claims, including statutory claims such as alleged section
510 violations.61 These circuits conclude that the requirement of an
internal appeals procedure indicates a congressional intent to require exhaustion in all cases.62 The general requirement that claimants exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit,
these courts maintain, demonstrates Congress's desire to minimize
all types of frivolous claims.63 This Part argues to the contrary that
58. In one illustrative case, the Eleventh Circuit found that a plan denied a claimant
meaningful access to plan procedures because plan administrators failed to provide docu·
ments describing the remedies available under the plan. Curry v. Contract Fabricators Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1990).
59. See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 685 (1981).
60. See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1980); Curry, 891 F.2d at 846.
No ERISA benefits case, however, appears to have applied the exception for inadequate
remedies. The lack of cases arising under this exception is not surprising. Benefits claimants
seek only the benefits promised by the plan. As a result, the remedies available under plan
procedures provide the identical relief available in court.
61. See Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 160 (11th Cir. 1992); Kross v. Western
Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1983).
62. See 961 F.2d at 160; 701 F.2d at 1245.
63. See 961 F.2d at 160 ("Policy considerations supporting the exhaustion requirement
include reducing the number of lawsuits under ERISA."); Powell v. AT&T, 938 F.2d 823, 826
(7th Cir. 1991) ("Congress's apparent intent in mandating internal claims procedures found
in ERISA .•• was to minimize the number of frivolous lawsuits.").
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the rationale for requiring exhaustion for benefits claims does not
support imposing an exhaustion requirement for section 510 claims.
Section II.A explores the evidence of congressional intent on which
the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits rely and argues that this
evidence indicates that Congress never intended, nor even anticipated, that section 510 claimants would utilize a plan's internal procedures. Section 510 therefore lacks the tension that the exhaustion
requirement seeks to resolve - the tension between a congressional intent to encourage private resolution of disputes and a congressional intent to provide access to the courts. Section II.B
argues that even if courts generally require exhaustion for statutory
BRISA claims, they should nonetheless waive the requirement for
most section 510 claims through the judicially recognized exceptions for futility and inadequate remedies.
A. Evidence of Congressional Intent

Although the exhaustion requirement is a judicial creation, its
application turns on principles of statutory construction.64 Courts
apply an exhaustion requirement to resolve the tension between apparently conflicting congressional goals - providing access to
courts, on the one hand, and promoting private dispute resolution,
on the other.65 Part I demonstrated that the text, history, and purposes of BRISA make application of the exhaustion requirement
reasonable in the context of benefits claims. Nothing, however, indicates that Congress intended individuals bringing claims under
section 510 to exhaust plan remedies before bringing suit. Indeed,
the text and legislative history of BRISA indicate that Congress
only anticipated that plans would provide a remedy for breach of
the plan; Congress never anticipated that plans would provide a
procedure for handling claims based on a violation of BRISA itself.

Courts have also concluded that requiring exhaustion for statutory claims serves the congressional purpose of enhancing the expertise of fiduciaries, just as this purpose is served by
requiring exhaustion for benefits claims. See Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d
1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that exhaustion of plan procedures "enhance[s] the plan
trustees' ability to carry out their fiduciary duties expertly and efficiently by preventing premature judicial intervention in the decisionmaking process"), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1087
(1986); Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245 (reaching the same conclusion).
64. See Amato, 618 F.2d at 566 ("It is true that the text of ERISA nowhere mentions the
exhaustion doctrine. The question therefore may be raised as to whether Congress intended
to grant the authority to the courts to apply that doctrine to suits arising under ERISA.");
Manley, supra note 28, at 967 (arguing that exhaustion should apply to benefits claims because "Congress specifically intended that claimants exhaust internal procedures prior to
bringing an action under ERISA"}.
65. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
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1. Evidence from the Text of ERISA
Some courts have relied on BRISA section 503 to support an
exhaustion requirement for statutory claims.66 This section, however, applies only to claims for benefits. Section 503 provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor], every employee benefit plan shall (1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting
forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim
for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.67

By its terms, the procedure required by section 503 covers only benefits claims; section 503 says nothing about statutory claims.6s Reliance on the text of section 503 to require exhaustion of plan
remedies for section 510 claims makes little sense because section
503 provides no remedy for section 510 plaintiffs to exhaust.69 Section 503 thus provides no support for a congressional intent to require exhaustion for statutory claims.
2. Evidence from the Legislative History of ERISA
Although the legislative history of BRISA indicates a congressional intent to require exhaustion for benefits claims, the legislative history suggests that this requirement should not apply to
statutory claims. As Part I discussed, the conference report to
BRISA states that courts should treat benefits claims according to
principles derived from LMRA section 301, which courts have held
to require exhaustion.70 Some courts point to this statement in the
66. See Mason, 763 F.2d at 1227; Amato, 618 F.2d at 567.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988) (emphasis added).
68. See Zipf v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The provision relating to
internal claims and appeals procedures, Section 503, refers only to procedures regarding
claims for benefits. There is no suggestion that Congress meant for these internal remedial
procedures to embrace Section 510 claims based on violations of ERISA's substantive
guarantees.").
Department of Labor regulations implementing ERISA support the conclusion that § 503
deals only with benefits claims. These regulations speak only to the procedures for handling
benefits claims and nowhere mention a procedure for handling statutory claims. The regulations state: "This section sets out certain minimum requirements for employee benefit plan
procedures pertaining to claims by participants and beneficiaries (claimants) for plan benefits, consideration of such claims, and review of claim denials." 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(a)
(1993) (emphasis added). The Department of Labor regulations, like ERIS A itself, nowhere
suggest that the § 503 procedure applies to statutory as well as benefits claims.
69. See Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1984) ("There is no
internal appeal procedure either mandated or recommended by ERISA to hear these
claims.").
70. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 42, at 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5107. See supra notes 31-35, 42-44 and accompanying text.
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conference report as evidence that Congress intended to require exhaustion for all BRISA claims.71 The text of the report, however,
does not support this conclusion. The report states:
[W]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to
recover benefits under the plan which do not involve application of the
title I provisions . .. [a]ll such actions in Federal or State courts are to
be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.72

This statement discusses benefits claims only. More importantly,
the conference report specifically excludes claims that "involve application of title I provisions" from the scope of those claims that
should be guided by LMRA section 301. Title I of BRISA specifies
the statutory standards that govern plans and includes the antidiscrimination protection embodied in section 510.73 The conference
report therefore only instructs courts to apply LMRA principles including the exhaustion requirement - to benefits claims, not to
statutory claims like those arising under section 510.
B.

The Applicability to Section 510 Claims of the Exceptions to
the Exhaustion Requirement

The previous section argued that neither the text nor the history
of BRISA support a requirement that plaintiffs bringing statutory
claims must exhaust plan remedies before suing in federal court.
This section examines whether, even if an exhaustion requirement
generally applies to statutory BRISA claims, statutory claims based
on section 510 should fall within one of the judicially recognized
exceptions to exhaustion. Section II.B.1 argues that the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement should apply to most section
510 claims. Because plan administrators typically are aligned with
the employer, resort to plan procedures to determine whether the
employer is guilty of employment discrimination raises a strong
possibility of bias, which makes such a resort to plan procedures
futile. Section II.B.2 argues that the inadequate remedies exception
should excuse the exhaustion requirement for most section 510
71. See Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1301 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985); Mason v.
Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 {11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1087
(1986).
72. H.R CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 42, at 327 reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5107 (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this statement to mean that principles established under LMRA § 301 should apply to ERISA claims. See, e.g., Mason, 763 F.2d at
1227; Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980). One commentator, however,
argues that the statement actually refers only to whether ERISA actions arise under federal
law rather than state law. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEXAS L.
REv. 509, 559 (1990).
73. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1168 (1988).
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claims because plan procedures typically provide only for recovery
of plan benefits, which do not fully compensate a victim of section
510 employment discrimination.
1. The Futility Exception
Under the futility exception, courts do not require exhaustion of
plan remedies when a plaintiff can show that the private decisionmaker clearly is biased against her claim, making resort to the
plan procedures a waste of the plaintiff's time and resources.74 In
the labor law context, the Supreme Court has held that it would be
futile to require those alleging discrimination to submit their claims
to arbitrators chosen by the alleged wrongdoers. In Glover v. St.
Louis-San Francisco Railway, 75 the Supreme Court held that it
would be a waste of time to require the plaintiffs to submit their
race discrimination claim to " 'a group which is in large part chosen
by the [defendants] against whom their real complaint is made.' " 76
It would be no less futile to require an employee claiming discrimination under BRISA section 510 to submit her claim to the
plan administrator when the administrator is selected by the employer. In most single-employer plans, the person designated by
the plan to handle claims is aligned with the employer.77 BRISA
does not require plans to appoint a disinterested decisionmaker to
handle claims-review procedures. Rather, it only requires that the
decisionmaker be an "appropriate named fiduciary." 78 Under Department of Labor regulations, this fiduciary "may be the plan administrator or any other person designated by the plan."79
Following these regulations, plans typically endow the employer
with exclusive authority to decide who hears claims.so Requiring
section 510 claimants to exhaust plan remedies, therefore, would
force them to present their claims of discrimination to those aligned
with the alleged wrongdoer. In fact, the person alleged to have violated section 510 may be the plan administrator herself.81 Utilizing
plan remedies when an employee alleges discrimination by the plan
74. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
75. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
76. 393 U.S. at 330 (quoting Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 206 (1944)).
77. See HENRY H. PERRirr, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS LAw AND PRACTICE 24344 (1990) ("Employers usually are the administrators of single-employer plans sponsored by
them.").
78. 29 u.s.c. § 1133 (1988).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l{g)(2) {1993).
80. Joseph R. Simone, Statutory Framework, Language, and Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of ER/SA, in UNDERSTANDING BRISA: AN INrRoDuCTioN TO BASIC EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS 9, 18 {1990).
81. See, e.g., Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1986). Note that this
creates a potential bias problem even for those multiemployer plans in which the administrator is not directly selected by the claimant's employer.
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administrator would allow the alleged wrongdoer to serve as her
own judge. Certainly, a court cannot expect those accused of discrimination to make an objective determination of their own guilt.
Even when the decisionmaker under the plan procedure is not the
section 510 defendant, bias inevitably arises when the plan's named
fiduciary is drawn from management. Utilizing plan procedures in
such cases would require the plaintiff to bring her discrimination
claim before an official of the very organization alleged to have discriminated against her.
It is true that inJ the context of benefits claims, courts have rejected the argument that pursuing plan remedies would be futile
when plan administrators are aligned with the employer.82 As in
the context of discrimination claims, plan administrators aligned
with the employer sponsoring the plan may have an incentive to
deny benefits claims.83 The courts have concluded, however, that
Congress intended plan administrators to have primary responsibility for deciding benefits claims.84 Thus, to hold that beneficiaries
need not pursue plan procedures when administrators are aligned
with employers would be to oust administrators from the role Congress intended.85 In addition, Congress attempted to ensure the
neutrality of plan administrators in determining benefits by imposing the so-called "exclusive benefit" rule. This rule establishes that
plan administrators must work "for the exclusive purpose" of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.86 The exclusive benefit rule protects benefits claimants against bias by
imposing an enforceable fiduciary duty on plan administrators to
determine benefits eligibility fairly.s1
The reasons for concluding that benefits claimants must exhaust
plan remedies even though plan administrators are aligned with the
employer do not apply to section 510 claims. As section II.A
demonstrated, nothing in BRISA or its legislative history suggests
that Congress intended plan administrators to determine whether
82. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "the appeal
procedures are not inadequate simply because they are administered by the Trustees themselves, rather than some 'neutral arbitrator' "); Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs.' Group Health
Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Amato); Denton v. First Natl. Bank, 765
F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Amato).
83. See Springer, 908 F.2d at 901 (noting the lower court finding that plan administrators
have "an interest in holding costs down" (internal quotations omitted)); Denton, 165 F.2d at
1303 (acknowledging that plan administrators are not neutral decisionmakers); Amato, 618
F.2d at 569 (same).
84. See, e.g., Amato, 618 F.2d at 569 ("The internal administration of such procedures is
the very thing contemplated by section 503 ..• .''); Springer, 908 F.2d at 901.
85. See, e.g., 618 F.2d at 569; 908 F.2d at 901.
86. 29 u.s.c. § 1104 (1988).
87. ERISA § 503 requires that appeals of benefits determinations be both "full and fair."
29 u.s.c. § 1133 (1988).
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an employer has discriminated against an employee. Thus, granting
alleged victims of discrimination immediate access to the courts
would not deprive administrators of any congressionally assigned
functions. In addition, the exclusive benefit rule does not protect
section 510 claimants. The rule only instructs fiduciaries to provide
benefits to plan participants. Section 510 claimants ordinarily seek
reinstatement and back pay, not benefits,88 and the terms of the
exclusive benefit rule therefore do not apply. Thus, neither the
plan administrator's statutory role nor the exclusive benefit rule
provide reason to reject Glover's warning that victims of discrimination are unlikely to get a fair hearing from a plan administrator
aligned with the perpetrator of the discrimination.
2. Inadequate Remedies
ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes courts to award successful
section 510 claimants "appropriate equitable relief" adequate to
"redress [the] violation[ ]."89 Such relief may include remedies unavailable under plan procedures.9° Courts considering the remedies
available to prevailing section 510 plaintiffs have concluded that
section 502(a)(3) authorizes awards suitable to return the plaintiff
to the position in which she would have been but for the act of
discrimination.91 A court's equitable power under section 502(a)(3)
includes "awarding the plaintiff backpay, reinstatement to his former position, restitution of his forfeited benefits, and any other relief necessary to make him whole. " 92
In contrast to the broad equitable relief courts may provide
under ERISA section 502(a)(3), plan procedures generally ensure
88. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
90. See William C. Martucci & John L. Utz, Unlawful Interference with Protected Rights
Under ERISA, 2 LAB. LAW. 251, 262-65 (1986).
91. See e.g., Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bittner v.
Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980). The legislative history of
ERISA supports the power of courts to fashion broad relief for § 510 claimants:
The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing
violations [of ERISA]. The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal
and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective
enforcement ....
S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (emphasis
added). This passage has led courts and commentators to conclude that the equitable power
under ERISA § 510 "is broad enough to recreate the circumstances that would have existed
absent an employer's illegal conduct." Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1015; see also Terry Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510 - A Funher Limitation on Arbitrary Discharges, 10 INous. REL.
LJ. 319, 343-48 (1988); Martucci & Utz, supra note 90, at 262-65.
92. Bittner, 490 F. Supp. at 536. In some circumstances, courts may determine that
awarding reinstatement would be inappropriate because of the antagonism between the parties, and order front pay instead. Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1018-19.
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only that claimants will receive the benefits denied them. The
BRISA scheme manifests only an intent to require that plan administrators make these benefits determinations fairly. Thus, section
503, which requires plans to include a review procedure for benefits
denials, does not anticipate that plans will make available any additional remedy other than the benefits at issue.93 Section 503 requires only that plans provide for a "full and fair review" of benefit
denials.94 If successful, those employing plan remedies can expect
to receive only the benefits to which they were entitled under the
plan.
Providing an award of benefits does not make section 510 claimants whole. In many cases, section 510 claimants lost their jobs
before they would have become eligible for benefits.95 Even if
claimants can prove that such actions were taken to prevent them
from becoming eligible for benefits, such claimants cannot recover
lost benefits because they had not yet become entitled to any benefits. Only such equitable awards as back pay, front pay, and reinstatement can fully redress the harm caused by this type of
employment discrimination.96 Plan benefits provide inadequate
remedies for discrimination under section 510; courts therefore
should not require section 510 claimants to exhaust plan
procedures.
III.

THE ARBITRABILITY OF SECTION

510

CLAIMS

The previous Part argued that as a matter of statutory construction, courts should not require alleged victims of benefits-based discrimination to exhaust the remedies provided by an ERISAgovemed plan before bringing suit. A different problem arises,
however, when the parties to a section 510 claim have agreed in a
contract separate from the plan itself to settle their disputes through
arbitration. As Part II argued, BRISA itself does not impose an
exhaustion requirement. However, separate arbitration agreements
may have independent force. Whether failure to exhaust an arbitral
remedy should bar a section 510 claim turns not on an interpreta93. See supra text accompanying note 67 (quoting§ 503).
94. 29 u.s.c. § 1133(2) (1988).
95. See Zipf v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 893 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that the plaintiff "is making no claim for benefits and concedes that she is not entitled to disability payments" (emphasis added)); Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1015 (concluding that" '(t)he inescapable inference is that
an ulterior motive lay behind defendants' maneuvers, and that a speedy discharge, before [the
plaintiff's] pension vested, was aimed at'" (emphasis added) (quoting Ursic v. Bethlehem
Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571, 575 (W.D. Pa. 1983))).
96. See Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1016 (concluding that back pay, reinstatement, and restitution of benefits were necessary to make the plaintiff whole); Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy
Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding that back pay, reinstatement, and
restitution of benefits may be awarded to make plaintiffs whole).
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tion of BRISA but on the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement.
The federal courts disagree over whether failure to exhaust arbitral remedies constitutes a valid ground for dismissing statutory
BRISA claims, including section 510 claims.97 The Ninth Circuit
has held that BRISA statutory claims are not subject to arbitration.98 As a result, plaintiffs bringing section 510 claims in the
Ninth Circuit need not exhaust arbitral remedies.99 Until November 1993, the Third Circuit agreed;100 then, reversing itself, it joined
the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that
BRISA statutory claims are subject to arbitration.101 These circuits
require section 510 claimants to exhaust any available arbitral
remedies.
This Part argues that the question whether section 510 claimants
must exhaust arbitral remedies before resorting to court depends
on the type of contract in which the arbitration agreement appears.
Section III.A surveys federal law regarding the arbitration of claims
based on statutes. Although the Supreme Court has held consistently that arbitration is appropriate to resolve breach-of-contract
claims,102 the Court has expressed greater reluctance to enforce the
97. Although the Supreme Court has never determined the arbitrability of§ 510 claims,
the Court has indicated that certain statutory ERISA claims may be subject to commercial
arbitration. In Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc. v. Bird, 493 U.S. 884 (1989), the
Supreme Court vacated a judgment by the Second Circuit holding that claims alleging breach
of ERISA's fiduciary standards are not subject to commercial arbitration. Drawing support
from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S 36 {1973), discussed infra in section III.A.2,
the Second Circuit had concluded as a general rule that statutory ERISA claims are not
subject to commercial arbitration. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 871
F.2d 292, 295-98 {2d Cir.), vacated, 493 U.S. 884 {1989). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded the case in light of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), a commercial arbitration decision. 493 U.S. at
884-85. On remand, the Second Circuit concluded that the claim was arbitrable. Bird v.
Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501U.S.1251
(1991). This case, however, does not address the arbitrability of § 510 claims.
98. Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. 724 F.2d at 750-52.
100. See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985).
101. Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993);
Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961F.2d157 (11th Cir. 1992); Bird v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991); Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988).
102. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. l, 24-25
(1983) ("[Under the Federal Arbitration Act] any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability."); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union,
430 U.S. 243, 254-55 {1977) (holding that federal labor law expresses a strong presumption
that disputes over interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement are subject to
arbitration).
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arbitration of claims based on statutes.103 Recently, however, the
Court has concluded that certain statutory claims may be subject to
arbitration.104 The Court has suggested that the test for determining whether statutory claims will be subject to arbitration depends
on whether the arbitration agreement is governed by the LMRA or
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Section III.A shows that this,
in turn, depends on whether the arbitration agreement appears in a
collective bargaining agreement, a commercial contract, or an individual employment contract. Section III.B applies these principles
and argues that courts should require arbitration of section 510
claims pursuant to commercial contracts but should not require arbitration of section 510 claims pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements.105 Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether courts examining arbitration pursuant to individual employment contracts should follow labor arbitration precedent or
commercial arbitration precedent, this Part concludes that commercial arbitration presents a closer analogy and that courts should require plaintiffs to exhaust arbitration pursuant to individual
employment contracts.
A.

Federal Arbitration Law

Federal policy, reflected in federal statutes and Supreme Court
decisions, supports private arbitration as a means of settling private
disputes. 106 Federal law makes arbitration agreements enforceable
in state and federal courts.107 The Supreme Court has concluded
that parties to an arbitration agreement must pursue arbitration
before resorting to federal court108 and that judicial review of arbi103. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1973) (holding that labor
arbitration cannot resolve an employee's claim of discrimination under Title VII); Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding that arbitration provides an inappropriate forum for
resolving claims under the 1933 Securities Act).
104. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(reversing Wilko and holding that arbitration may resolve claims under the 1933 Securities
Act).
105. Professor G. Richard Shell has reached the same conclusion. See Shell, supra note
72, at 517 (concluding that "commercial arbitration, but not labor arbitration, provides procedures that are an adequate substitute for the courts to resolve all claims under ERISA"). For
contrary views, compare Manley, supra note 28, at 972-73 (arguing that statutory ERISA
claimants generally should not be required to submit to either commercial or labor arbitra·
tion) with Charles S. Mishkind, Protected Rights Under Section 510 of ERISA: Avoiding
"Something for Nothing," in ALl-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: QUALIFIED PLANS, PCs, AND
WELFARE BENEFrrs 425, 444-45 (1991) (arguing that § 510 claims should be subject to both
commercial and labor arbitration).
106. See FAA§ 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988); supra
note 102.
107. FAA § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
108. Republic Steel CofP.. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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tral decisions is limited to whether the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of her authority.109
Until recently, however, the Supreme Court refused to require
arbitration of claims involving alleged violations of statutes.110
Thus, the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate "any controversy" arising between two parties would not be enforced for a
claim that federal securities law had been violated, and the plaintiff
could bring her securities claim in federal court without resorting to
arbitration.111 In recent years, however, the Court has changed
course and has begun to enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes
involving statutory questions.112
This section examines Supreme Court decisions regarding the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Section
III.A.1 examines why federal law distinguishes between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration. Section III.A.2 discusses
Supreme Court opinions concerning arbitration of statutory claims
in the labor law context, in which the Supreme Court has consistently refused to require arbitration of statutory claims. Section
III.A.3 explores Supreme Court opinions concerning arbitration of
statutory claims pursuant to commercial contracts. These opinions
enforce such arbitration. In contrast to the labor law cases, these
cases conclude that arbitrators are competent to interpret statutes
and that arbitration provides an appropriate forum for resolving
statutory claims. Section III.A.4 considers the impact of the
Court's most recent decision in this area, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 113 Although Gilmer arises out of a commercial
contract, the opinion confirms that arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement remains an inappropriate forum for
resolving statutory claims because of the tension between individual
rights and collective representation.
1.

The Distinction Between Labor Arbitration and Commercial
Arbitration

Arbitration may be fairly divided into two categories: labor arbitration and commercial arbitration. Each category of arbitration
is governed by its own statutory authority and body of precedent,
109. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960).
110. See supra note 103-04 and accompanying text.
111. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 n.15 (1953).
112. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (overruling Wilko and holding that claims under federal securities laws are subject to
arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (holding that claims under federal antitrust laws are subject to arbitration
agreements).
113. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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each employs its own procedures, and each is seen by the courts as
serving different functions.114
Labor arbitration refers to arbitration governed by section 301
of the LMRA.115 Labor arbitration represents the final stage of the
grievance procedure provided by most collective bargaining agreements.116 Professor G. Richard Shell has succinctly described the
labor arbitration process as follows:
Essentially, employees have the right under the collective-bargaining
agreement to file a grievance if they feel their rights have been violated under the labor contract. Once filed, however, the grievance is
handled by the union, not the individual employee. ...
If, after presenting the grievance to the company, the union is dissatisfied with the result, it may pursue the claim through successively
higher levels of grievance machinery.
If the parties cannot resoive the dispute through the grievance
process, the union may invoke arbitration under the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The union and management select an arbitrator, who then holds hearings. In these
proceedings, the employee's interests are represented by the union,
which typically uses a business agent whose full-time job is dealing
with grievances.117

The unique and crucial aspect of labor arbitration is that the union
- not the individual employee - controls when and how to proceed with arbitration.118 In so doing, the union must only fulfill its
duty of fair representation, which it fulfills so long as it acts in good
faith and in a nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory fashion.119
Federal law has long supported this form of arbitration as a
means of resolving labor disputes and avoiding the problems associ114. As Shell observes:
Scholars have long noted two models of the arbitration process. Under the first model,
arbitration is viewed as a form of extended negotiation between highly interdependent
parties. The first model requires arbitrators to act as agents of the parties and formulate
compromises on difficult matters of contract interpretation, thereby preserving the parties' relationship. Under the second model, arbitration is a cheap and efficient form of
trial for resolving transactional disputes. The second model requires arbitrators to act as
judges.
Labor arbitration under LMRA section 301 has aspired to the first model ..•• By
contrast, commercial arbitration under the FAA has molded its procedures to fit the
second model.
Shell, supra note 72, at 512.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); see Shell, supra note 72, at 518 (noting that the Supreme
Court has "develop[ed] a federal common law of labor arbitration under section 301 of the
LMRA").
116. See BNA, BAs1c PATTERNS, supra note 19, at 38 (noting that 98% of union contracts
sampled contained arbitration provisions); FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 153 (4th ed. 1985).
117. Shell, supra note 72, at 519-20 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
118. See ELKouru & ELKOURI, supra note 116, at 175-80 (discussing representation of
employees in grievance proceedings).
119. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
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ated with strikes, lockouts, and boycotts.120 As the Supreme Court
has noted, the labor arbitrator performs a unique role in the relations between the parties to a labor contract:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the courts ....
. . . The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance
will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the . . .
agreement permits, such factors as the effect on productivity of a particular result, its consequences on the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.121

Shell has also noted that "a substantial amount of evidence indicates that arbitrators often split the difference between the conflicting parties rather than render an 'all-or-nothing' decision. Such
decisions echo the overall purpose of labor arbitration - keeping
industrial peace."122
The role of labor arbitrators is strictly limited to interpreting the
terms of collective bargaining agreements. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice."123 In fact, if an arbitral
decision is "based solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation," the arbitrator has exceeded the scope
of his authority and the award will not be enforced.124
In contrast to labor arbitration, commercial arbitration simply
represents an alternative to a judicial forum. Commercial arbitration refers to arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925.125 The FAA establishes that, as a matter of substantive
federal law applicable in state and federal courts, courts must enforce all agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes as long
as the underlying contract affects interstate commerce.126 The FAA
excludes from its coverage, however, "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce."127 The Court has nonetheless
enforced arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining
120. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960)
(observing that arbitration "substitutes a regime of peaceful settlement for the older regime
of industrial conflict"); Shell, supra note 72, at 518.
121. 363 U.S. at 581-82.
122. Shell, supra note 72, at 521-22; see NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN, SUCCESSFUL LABOR RELATIONS 229 (1978).
123. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
124. 363 U.S. at 597.
125. 9
§§ 1-15 (1988).
126. 9
§ 2 (1988).
127. 9
§ 1 (1988).

u.s.c.
u.s.c.
u.s.c.
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agreements, through section 301 of the LMRA.128 The Court has
employed the FAA for all other arbitration agreements, from one
contained in a contract between a stock broker and customer129 to
one contained in an application..for registration with the New York
Stock Exchange.130
As Shell has noted, the procedure for bringing a claim in commercial arbitration differs fundamentally from that involved in labor arbitration:
At the outset, the aggrieved plaintiffs in commercial cases have usually agreed in a signed contract to arbitrate their disputes.... This
scenario contrasts with that of labor arbitration, in which the union
has negotiated and signed the arbitration clause on behalf of its members. Moreover, plaintiffs in commercial arbitration individually control the decision to proceed with a claim and may select their own
lawyer or agent to represent their interests. They do not depend, as in
the collective bargaining context, on [the union] to control the resolution of the dispute.131

The primary differences in the commercial arbitration process are
that individuals represent themselves both in the negotiation of
commercial contracts and in the resolution of disputes arising under
such contracts;132 neither is true in the collective bargaining context.
Commercial and labor arbitration also differ in their use of substantive law. Commercial arbitrators - unlike labor arbitrators are not strictly confined to the terms of the contract when making
awards. Commercial arbitration decisions often rely upon public
law,133 and arbitrators are encouraged by professional arbitration
organizations to grant awards on the merits of legal claims.134
Summarizing the distinction between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration, the Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n the
commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. [Labor]
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife."135

2. Labor Arbitration
The Supreme Court has consistently held that individual statutory claims fall outside the scope of labor arbitration. 136 As this
128. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
129. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/knerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
130. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
131. Shell, supra note 72, at 531.
132. See generally GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01
(1991) (describing the commercial arbitration process).
133. See id. § 25.01.
134. See Shell, supra note 72, at 532.
135. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
136. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to labor arbitration); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
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section demonstrates, however, the basis for this holding has shifted
over time. Initially, the Court based its conclusion on two rationales. First, the Court concluded that arbitration provides a procedurally inappropriate forum for resolving statutory claims:
arbitrators lack competence in interpreting statutes, the Court concluded, and the procedures of arbitration do not offer the legal formalities available in court.137 Second, the Court concluded that the
purpose of labor arbitration - maintaining collective industrial
peace in the face of issues that affect an entire workforce - does
not comport with the goal of resolving the individual statutory
claims of individual employees.138 Recently, however, the Court rejected the former rationale and concluded that arbitration does provide a procedurally adequate forum for hearing statutory
disputes. 139 The Court nevertheless has indicated that the latter rationale remains valid; enforcing the collective obligations of labor
and management still does not jibe with enforcing individual
rights. 140 As a result, this section argues, labor arbitration remains
an inappropriate forum for resolving individual statutory claims.
In the 1974 case Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 141 the
Supreme Court held that arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does not bar a subsequent Title VII claim.142
The plaintiff pursued arbitration in compliance with the collective
bargaining agreement, claiming that his employer had fired him in
violation of the agreement. The collective bargaining agreement
prohibited dismissals without "just cause" and also prohibited discrimination on the basis of race. After the arbitrator ruled that the
employer had cause to discharge the employee, the employee
brought a Title VII claim in federal court alleging that he had been
fired on the basis of race. The district court dismissed the case,
holding that the arbitral decision had disposed of the discrimination
claim. The court of appeals affirmed.1 43
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 are not subject to labor arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974) (holding that labor arbitration cannot resolve claims under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act).
137. 415 U.S. at 57-58; see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
138. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739-40; Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. at 51, 55; see also infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
139. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see also infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
_
140. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991); see also infra
notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
141. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
142. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
143. 415 U.S. at 45-54.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII provides a
remedy that is independent of the remedies available under a collective bargaining agreement. 144 The Court concluded that the
plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo on his Title VII claim.145
The Court therefore allowed employees under a union contract to
pursue arbitration, litigation, or both:
We think ... that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment
practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to
pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of
his collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under
Title VII.146

The Court cited two reasons for its decision. First, the Court stated
that arbitration provides a procedurally inadequate forum for
resolving statutory claims.147 The competence of labor arbitrators,
the Court wrote, "pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the
law of the land." 148 Moreover, arbitral procedures do not allow for
the extensive fact-finding necessary to resolve Title VII claims.149
In addition, arbitrators generally are not required to produce written opinions explaining the rationale for their decisions, and thus,
arbitration does not create a body of decisions informing employers
of the legality of their actions.150
Second, the Court found that because a collective bargaining
agreement constitutes a contract between an employer and a union
- not an employer and an individual employee - it cannot be
used to waive an individual employee's statutory rights. 151 A union
may waive through negotiation any rights statutorily conferred
upon it, but a union may not waive an individual employee's statutory rights. For instance, a union may waive its statutory right to
strike, because this right properly belongs to the union. 152 The right
to be free from race discrimination, in contrast, belongs to the indi144. 415 U.S. at 43.
145. 415 U.S. at 60.
146. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
147. 415 U.S. at 56 ("Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution
of rights created by Title VII.").
·
148. 415 U.S. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)).
149. 415 U.S. at 57.
150. 415 U.S. at 57. The Court also found deficiencies in other aspects of arbitral procedures: "(T]he usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to
civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable." 415 U.S. at 57-58.
151. 415 U.S. at 47-54; see also Shell, supra note 72, at 519 n.48.
152. 415 U.S. at 51 ("It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike••.. These rights are conferred on
employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or
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vidual employee, not to her union. 153 A union, therefore, may not
waive an individual's right to a judicial forum for a Title VII claim
because Title VII "represent[s] a congressional command that each
employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the
rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process ...."154
The decision in Gardner-Denver reflects the Supreme Court's
acknowledgment that the process of labor arbitration creates a
tension between the interests of individual employees and their
unions. 155 As discussed above, once an employee files a grievance,
the union, not the individual employee, pursues it.156 A union may
decide not to spend its resources on a particular grievance.151 If
individual statutory claims were subject to labor arbitration, the individual claimant could be bound by her union's handling of the
claim.158 To resolve the potential conflict between individual and
collective rights, the Gardner-Denver Court concluded that collective bargaining agreements cannot grant unions the authority to decide how, or whether, to press an individual's Title VII claim.159
As a result of Gardner-Denver, individual employees are free to
bring Title VII claims in federal court regardless of the results of
labor arbitration.160 In two subsequent cases, the,Court extended
its decision in Gardner-Denver to individual rights guaranteed by
relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for
union members." (citations omitted)).
153. 415 U.S. at 51 ("Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities.").
154. 415 U.S. at 51.
155. Cf. Shell, supra note 72, at 519 n.48 ("The collective bargaining agreement is a contract between the union and the employer, not between the individual employee and the
employer. Thus, the employee who files a grievance is, in essence, bringing a violation of the
agreement to the attention of the union, which has the contractual right to contest the
matter.").
156. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
157. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981) ("[E]ven
if the employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without breaching its duty of fair
representation, reasonably and in good faith decide not to support the claim vigorously in
arbitration.").
158. This result would flow from the great deference courts give to arbitral decisions. See
supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
159. 415 U.S. at 51. As Chief Justice Burger later explained, the Court in GardnerDenver was concerned that given the history of discrimination within unions, granting unions
exclusive authority to press an individual member's discrimination claim through arbitration
"would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens." Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 750 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
160. 415 U.S. at 59-60 (ordering de nova review of the plaintiff's Title VII claim despite
completed arbitration involving the same factual issues). It should be noted, however, that
the Court allowed the district court to admit the arbitral decision as evidence in the Title VII
claim and provided that this evidence be "accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate." 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
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other statutes,161 declaring that the principles embodied in Gardner-Denver apply to statutes "designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers." 162
Although Gardner-Denver makes clear that arbitration does not
preclude federal claims, courts could nonetheless require claimants
to exhaust arbitral remedies before seeking judicial relief. The
Supreme Court, however, has effectively rejected such an exhaustion requirement for claims based on individual statutory rights. In
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 163 the Court held that a Title VII claim would
not be tolled during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. The
Court found that the decision in Gardner-Denver mandated that
there would be no tolling because that decision had clearly established the independence of the contractual and statutory dispute
mechanisms.164 As Judge Harry Edwards has observed, an exhaustion requirement for Title VII claims would be inconsistent with the
Court's decision in Robbins & Myers because it would have the effect of rendering many Title VII claims time-barred while still in
arbitration - hardly a result consistent with the independence of
the two remedies.16s
Lower courts have also concluded that requiring exhaustion of
arbitral remedies would run counter to the principles of GardnerDenver.166 These courts reason that, given the Supreme Court's
161. In Barrentine, the Supreme Court held that the principles of Gardner-Denver apply
to cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19
(1988). 450 U.S. at 745-46. Then, in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292
(1984), the Court held that Gardner-Denver applies to causes of action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Under these cases, arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement holds no preclusive effect for a subsequent FLSA or § 1983 claim.
162. 450 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added).
163. 429 U.S. 229, 230 (1976).
164. 429 U.S. at 236.
165. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1500-01 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J.,
concurring). Judge Edwards also cited the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), as additional evidence that the Supreme Court has
rejected an exhaustion requirement for individual statutory claims. See 925 F.2d at 1501. In
Railway Express, the Court held that a plaintiff seeking relief under both Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) need not exhaust her Title VII remedies before bringing the § 1981
claim. The Court stated that it was "disinclined, in the face of congressional emphasis upon
the existence and independence of the two remedies" to express a preference for one remedy
by requiring its procedures to be exhausted before the other's procedures could be invoked.
421 U.S. at 461. As Judge Edwards noted, Railway Express indicates that the Court views an
"exhaustion requirement as simply inconsistent with the notion of distinct and independent
remedies." 925 F.2d at 1501.
166. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that following
Gardner-Denver, race discrimination claimants need not pursue otherwise-required arbitration); Gibson v. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 543 F.2d 1259, 1266 n.14 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("Exhaustion of [arbitral remedies] is .•• not a precondition to a Title VII suit.");
Waters v. W1Sconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that "plaintiffs
could properly proceed .•. under section 1981 without first exhausting any contractual remedies .... "); see also Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1500 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("A close look
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conclusion that an individual's statutory rights are independent of
collectively bargained rights, they cannot require a plaintiff bringing
a claim under a statute protecting individual rights to exhaust the
remedies provided by a collective bargaining agreement. 167 By not
requiring exhaustion, these courts properly implement the Court's
conclusion that an individual may "fully pursue" both her statutory
rights and her rights under a collective bargaining agreement. As
the Court made clear in Gardner-Denver, labor arbitration can only
determine a plaintiff's collectively bargained rights - rights that
are independent of individual statutory rights.
3.

Commercial Arbitration

Although, as the previous section noted, the Supreme Court has
consistently held ·that courts cannot require plaintiffs to resolve statutory claims exclusively through labor arbitration, courts' willingness to allow statutory claims to be resolved in commercial
arbitration has undergone a dramatic shift in recent years. The
Supreme Court first considered the arbitrability of statutory claims
arising out of commercial agreements in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan.16s
The Court in Wilko held that claims under the Securities Act of
1933169 are not subject to a contractual agreement to arbitrate.17°
As in the labor cases, the Court expressed basic doubts about the
capacity of arbitrators to enforce statutory rights.171 The Court
concluded that statutory interpretation falls within the exclusive expertise of the judiciary.172 In 1989, however, the Court explicitly
overruled Wilko and held that commercial arbitrators may decide
purely statutory claims.173 The Court concluded that the decision in
Wilko was based on an "outmoded presumption of disfavoring
arbitration."174
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,11s
the Court endorsed a two-part test for determining the arbitrability
at Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald, and their progeny, reveals that the logic driving the
Court's holding in those cases would also preclude an exhaustion of remedies ... requirement for the statutes involved.").
167. See, e.g., Gibson, 543 F.2d at 1266 n.14.
168. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77b (1988).
170. 346 U.S. at 438.
171. 346 U.S. at 435-37 (reasoning that arbitration is inappropriate because arbitrators
lack legal training and because arbitration does not create a sufficient written opinion).
172. See 346 U.S. at 437 ("[T]he protective provisions of the Securities Act require the
exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness.").
173. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86
(1989).
174. 490 U.S. at 481.
175. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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of statutory claims under the FAA.176 Under this test, a court first
must determine as a matter of contract interpretation whether the
parties' agreement to arbitrate reaches the statutory claim asserted.177 If so, a court should then consider, under principles of
statutory interpretation, whether Congress intended to foreclose arbitration of the claim.178 Such a congressional intent to bar arbitration of a statutory claim must be apparent from the text, legislative
history, or purposes of the statute under which the claim is asserted.119 Current Supreme Court precedent therefore establishes a
presumption that statutory claims will be subject to commercial arbitration under the FAA, rebuttable by evidence of congressional
intent to the contrary.
The Court's reasoning in commercial arbitration cases rejects
the first of Gardner-Denver's rationales - that arbitration provides
a procedurally inadequate substitute for a judicial forum. 18° For
several years after Mitsubishi, it was therefore unclear whether labor arbitration, like commercial arbitration, would be considered
an adequate forum for statutory claims. In the 1991 case Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 181 the Supreme Court clarified the
matter, indicating that Gardner-Denver's second rationale - that
labor arbitration is inappropriate for individual statutory claims because of the tension between individual and collective representation - remains valid. In so doing, the next section demonstrates,
the Court upheld the distinction between labor and commercial arbitration and affirmed the continuing vitality of the earlier labor
arbitration cases.
4. Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims in Commercial
Arbitration: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
The Supreme Court held in Gilmer that commercial arbitration
provides an adequate forum for hearing a claim of employment discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA).182 Gilmer represents the first occasion on which the
176. 473 U.S. at 628.
177. 473 U.S. at 628.
178. The Court stated: "Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held
to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue." 473 U.S. at 628.
179. In Mitsubish4 the Court said that congressional intent must be "deducible from [the
statute's] text or legislative history." 473 U.S. at 628. The Court has subsequently stated that
statutory claims may also be exempted from commercial arbitration if there is an "inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
180. Mitsubish4 473 U.S. at 628-40.
181. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991}.
182. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). The facts of Gilmer are as follows. Robert Gilmer was
hired by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation in May 1981, and as part of the terms of em-
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Court has upheld the arbitrability of a statutory civil rights claim.
The Court in Gilmer did not, however, overrule Gardner-Denver
and its progeny. To the contrary, the Court expressly reaffirmed
the validity of its decisions regarding labor arbitration, implicitly
limiting its decision to commercial arbitration.183 In so doing, this
section argues, Gilmer suggests that the arbitrability of statutory
claims depends primarily on the type of contract containing the arbitration agreement, not on the type of statutory claim asserted.184
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court strongly implied that the standard for determining the arbitrability of statutory discrimination
claims depends on the type of contract containing the arbitration
agreement. The arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer appeared in a
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) registration application filed by
the plaintiff. Because the clause did not appear in the plaintiff's
contract with his employer, the Court concluded that the agreement
was governed by the FAA, which covers commercial contracts.185
The Court therefore applied Mitsubishi's two-part test,186 holding
that the parties had agreed to arbitrate and that the plaintiff had
not demonstrated that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of
ADEA claims.187 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that because
the plaintiff was required to submit the application as a term of his
employment, the arbitration agreement was part of the plaintiff's
employment contract.188 Stevens further argued that employment
contracts are not covered by the FAA and that the Mitsubishi test
should not apply. Thus, both the majority and dissenting opinions
in Gilmer seem to agree that the test for determining the arbiployment, Interstate required Gilmer to register with the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). The NYSE registration application contained a clause requiring Gilmer to arbitrate
"any dispute, claim or controversy" arising between Gilmer and Interstate. 500 U.S. at 23.
In 1987, Interstate fired Gilmer, and Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim under the
ADEA. Interstate responded by moving to compel arbitration under the arbitration agreement contained in the NYSE application. 500 U.S. at 23-24.
In upholding the arbitrability of the ADEA claim, the Supreme Court concluded that the
NYSE application containing the arbitration clause was not an employment contract of any
kind and therefore was governed by the FAA. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Consequently, the Court
applied Mitsubishi's two-part test. 500 U.S. at 26. The Court then found that Gilmer failed
to meet his burden of proving that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of ADEA
claims. 500 U.S. at 26-33.
183. 500 U.S. at 33-35.
184. Cf. Shell, supra note 72, at 514 (arguing that in determining the arbitrability of statutory claims, courts have not adequately considered the distinction between labor and commercial arbitration).
185. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. See supra notes 125-27 (discussing the coverage of the FAA).
The Court avoided the question of whether the FAA excludes all contracts of employment,
or only certain employment contracts, by deciding that the contract at issue was not an employment contract at all. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
186. 500 U.S. at 26.
187. 500 U.S. at 26.
188. 500 U.S. at 39-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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trability of statutory disputes turns on the type of contract containing the arbitration agreement.
The Gilmer majority explicitly distinguished its holding from
that of Gardner-Denver, suggesting that the decision in GardnerDenver remains good law.189 The Court distinguished the labor arbitration cases on three grounds. First, the Court stated that the
arbitration clauses at issue in the Gardner-Denver line of cases did
not constitute agreements to arbitrate individual statutory claims.
Rather, according to the Court, the collective bargaining agreements in those cases granted the labor arbitrator authority only to
· resolve questions involving interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.190 Because the contractual language in Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver was effectively the same, this statement cannot be
read as distinguishing the language of the specific agreements at
issue in the cases.191 Instead, it should be read to distinguish the
scope of labor arbitration from that of commercial arbitration.
Second, the Gilmer Court reaffirmed the vitality of GardnerDenver in the special context of union representation. The Court
stated that an "important concern [in Gardner-Denver] was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory
rights." 192 This tension, the Court stated, was absent in the nonunion context.193 In recharacterizing this concern, already voiced in
Gardner-Denver, the Gilmer Court reaffirmed Gardner-Denver's
resolution of the tension between individual rights and union repre189. 500 U.S. at 35.
190. In Gilmer, the Court stated that the Gardner-Denver line of cases
did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contractbased claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators
were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably
was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions.
500 U.S. at 35.
191. The NYSE registration in Gilmer called for arbitration of "any dispute, claim or
controversy." 500 U.S. at 23. In Gardner-Denver, the arbitration agreement provided for
arbitration of "any trouble" arising in the workplace. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 40 n.3 (1974). The arbitration agreement in Barrentine provided for the arbitration
of "any controversy which might arise." Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450
U.S. 728, 731 n5 (1981). The difference between the arbitration agreement in Gilmer and
those in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, therefore, does not derive from differences in contractual language. Instead, the Court read essentially the same contractual language in the
commercial context to include potential statutory disputes, but in the labor context, the
Court limited the scope of the clause to contractual conflicts. This distinction between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer comports well with the Court's differing models of labor and commercial arbitration. Restricting labor arbitration to disputes over the collective bargaining
agreement keeps labor arbitration focused on its fundamental goal - providing a method for
resolving workplace tensions and thus avoiding strikes. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
192. 500 U.S. at 35.
193. 500 U.S. at 35 (noting the "potential disparity in interests between a union and an
employee").
·
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sentation - a resolution that allows individual employees to litigate statutory claims despite the availability of labor arbitration.194
Third, the Gilmer Court pointed out that labor arbitration cases
such as Gardner-Denver were not decided under the FAA, which
reflects a " 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,'"
but instead were decided under the LMRA, which reflects very different concems.195 As discussed above, the primary goal of the
LMRA in supporting arbitration is to promote industrial peace - a
goal that the Supreme Court has concluded is incompatible with
enforcing individual rights.196
The three distinctions identified in Gilmer between the commercial contract in that case and the labor contracts in the GardnerDenver line of cases indicate that courts determining the arbitrability of statutory claims must apply one standard to arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements and another standard to arbitration under commercial agreements. Arbitration of statutory
claims pursuant to collective bargaining agreements should follow
the precedent established in Gardner-Denver and its progeny.
These cases hold that individual employees should not be required
to arbitrate claims based on statutes "designed to provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers." 197 When commercial contracts are involved, however, the test established in Mitsubishi makes clear that arbitration is an appropriate forum for
resolving statutory disputes unless Congress intended to preclude
arbitration of the dispute.198 The next section assesses section 510
claims in light of the different standards applied to labor and commercial arbitration.
B. Applying the Mitsubishi and Gardner-Denver Standards to
the Arbitration of Section 510 Claims

This section argues that under recent Supreme Court decisions
section 510 plaintiffs must exhaust arbitral remedies pursuant to
commercial contracts but need not arbitrate pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements. This section further concludes, however,
that the unique concerns that preclude labor arbitration of individual statutory claims are absent in the context of individual employment contracts.199 Consequently, courts should enforce arbitration
194. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60; supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
195. 500 U.S. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
196. See supra notes 120-22, 151-59 and accompanying text.
197. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981).
198. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
199. The Supreme Court has not stated whether individual employment contracts should
be governed by labor or commercial precedent. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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of section 510 claims when an arbitration agreement appears in an
individual employment contract.
1. Arbitration of Section 510 Claims Pursuant to Collective
Bargaining Agreements

Section 510 falls within the category of statutory provisions
"designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers. " 200 It guarantees individual employees protection against
employment discrimination on the basis of eligibility for benefits.201
Because section 510 falls within the type of claim precluded from
labor arbitration by Gardner-Denver, 202 courts should not require
arbitration of section 510 claims when the arbitration agreement
appears in a collective bargaining agreement.
The principles announced in Gardner-Denver with respect to the
arbitrability of Title VII discrimination claims apply with equal
force to section 510 discrimination claims. Unions lack authority to
negotiate over an individual's statutory rights.203 Thus, an employee should not lose her right to bring a section 510 claim in federal court as a result of an arbitration agreement contained in a
collective bargaining agreement.204 As with Title VII, the rights
conferred by BRISA section 510 "can form no part of the collective-bargaining process."205 Gardner-Denver and its progeny make
clear that labor arbitrators have no authority to decide an employee's rights under a statute, such as BRISA section 510, that was
designed to offer individuals minimum workplace protections.
Furthermore, employees bringing section 510 claims should not
be required to rely on their unions to advocate their claims. For a
variety of legitimate reasons, a union may choose not to press an
individual member's claim.206 Thus, a union's decision not to pursue an employee's claim with diligence should not bind a section
200. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737; see supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
202. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
203. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
204. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)
(holding that labor arbitrators may interpret only the terms of the agreement and may not
independently interpret public laws).
205. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
206. As the Court has noted:
[W]hen, as is usually the case, the union has exclusive control over the "manner and
extent to which an individual grievance is presented," there is an additional reason why
arbitration is an inadequate substitute for judicial proceedings. The union's interests and
those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a
result, the union may present the employee's grievance less vigorously, or make different
strategic choices, than would the employee.
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984) (citations omitted) (quoting
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981).
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510 claimant. Courts therefore should not require section 510
claimants to exhaust arbitral remedies pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
2. Arbitration of Section 510 Claims Pursuant to Commercial
Contrac~
-

The two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi determines the arbitrability of section 510 claims arising out of
commercial contracts.207 Under the first part of the test, a court
must determine whether an arbitration.clause reaches a section 510
claim.208 This requires the court to interpret the specific arbitration
clause at issue. The Supreme Court has indicated that "any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration." 2 09 This suggests that courts should read arbitration clauses purporting to require arbitration of "all disputes" to
cover any possible dispute between the parties, including statutory
claims.210 For example, the arbitration clause at issue in Gilmer,
which the Supreme Court concluded covered a statutory age discrimination claim, provided for arbitration over "any dispute, claim
or controversy" arising between the parties.211 Section 510 claims,
therefore, may be subject to arbitration even if the arbitration
clause does not refer specifically to section 510.212
If a court concludes that an arbitration agreement covers a section 510 claim, the second part of the Mitsubishi test requires that
the claim be subject to arbitration unless Congress specifically intended to preclude arbitration of section 510 claims.213 The text,
legislative history, and underlying purposes of BRISA do not
demonstrate such an intent. The text of BRISA makes no mention
of arbitration. BRISA section 514(d), however, does state that
"[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend,
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United
States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law."214
In Gilmer, the Court reaffirmed this reasoning, stating that Gardner-Denver adequately
resolved "the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a
concern not applicable" to commercial arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
2<rl. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
208. See 473 U.S. at 628.
209. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
210. See supra note 191.
211. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
212. See Mitsubishi, 473_ U.S. at 625 (rejecting the argument that in order to arbitrate a
statutory claim, the arbitration clause must refer to the particular statute).
213. 473 U.S. at 628; see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
214. 29 u.s.c. § 1144(d) (1988).
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In the absence of authority to the contrary, this provision confirms
the congressional support for commercial arbitration found in the
FAA.21s
Several other provisions of BRISA, however, may appear to
support a congressional intent to· foreclose arbitration of BRISAbased claims. One such provision can be found in BRISA's declaration of policy, in which Congress announced its intention of providing claimants "ready access to the Federal courts."21 6 Enforcing
arbitration agreements arguably denies section 510 claimants the
access to the courts that Congress intended. This argument, however, misconstrues congressional intent. Congress's intent to provide access to the courts is not equivalent to a congressional intent
to foreclose potential plaintiffs' ability to waive that right.21' Parties to arbitration agreements necessarily forgo access to the courts
in exchange for the procedures offered by commercial arbitration.21s The FAA expresses a congressional intent to support this
exchange. It does not follow that by providing a federal judicial
forum for section 510 claims Congress also intended to override the
goals of the FAA. In short, by providing section 510 claimants access to federal courts, Congress did not prevent them from choosing
an arbitral rather than a judicial forum.
The fact that BRISA provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction
for section 510 claims219 may also appear to support the argument
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of section 510
claims. As the Second Circuit has noted, however, this provision
"speaks only to which judicial forum [federal or state] is available,
not to whether an arbitral forum is also available."22° Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has already rejected the same argument in another context. Like BRISA, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.221 Yet the Court determined that claims under the Act are subject to arbitration.222 After
215. See Shell, supra note 72, at 558 (arguing that§ 514{d) suggests a congressional intent
to apply the FAA to statutory ERISA claims).
216. 29 U.S.C. § lOOl{b) {1988).
217. See Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 120 {2d Cir.
1991) (concluding that the "ready access to Federal courts" provision "does not speak to
whether Congress intended to require that parties avail themselves of that forum"): Arnulfo
P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 478·79 {8th Cir. 1988).
218. As the Court stated in Mitsubishi, "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 473 U.S. at 628.
219. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988).
220. Bird, 926 F.2d at 120 (emphasis added).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa {1988).
222. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); see also
Mitsubish~ 473 U.S. at 629 {finding claims under the Sherman Act arbitrable despite exclusive federal jurisdiction).
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the Court's decision, the Second Circuit concluded that " 'any claim
that the jurisdictional language of BRISA evidences a congressional
intent to foreclose arbitrability would appear to be untenable.' "223
The legislative history of BRISA similarly does not indicate a
congressional intent to foreclose arbitration of section 510 claims.
The Senate version of BRISA contained a provision requiring each
plan to provide for arbitration over "any dispute between the administrator of the plan and any participant or beneficiary of the
plan." 224 Because plan administrators may be subject to section 510
as well as other statutory BRISA claims,225 this provision would
have allowed for the arbitration of statutory claims. Although this
provision was eliminated by the Conference Committee, its elimination does not demonstrate a rejection of arbitration. In contrast
to the Senate version of BRISA, the House version included no
provision whatsoever for appeal of benefits decisions.226 As a compromise, the Conference Committee drafted section 503, which requires plans to include some procedure for appealing a plan
administrator's denial of benefits.227 Although section 503 does not
mention arbitration, the Conference Committee report indicates
that section 503 represents a compromise between mandating that
plans include a specific procedure - such as arbitration - and not
mandating that plans include any review procedure at all.228 By
making no mention of arbitration, section 503 therefore avoids the
question of the arbitrability of statutory BRISA claims, leaving this
question to be determined by existing law - the LMRA for labor
arbitration and the FAA for commercial arbitration.
Finally, arbitration pursuant to a commercial contract does not
undermine the underlying purposes of section 510. The purpose of
section 510 is to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
223. Bird, 926 F.2d at 120 (quoting Southside Internists Group v. Janus Capital Corp., 741
F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (N.D. Ala. 1990)); see also Shell, supra note 72, at 557-58 (arguing that
McMahon and Mitsubishi demonstrate that exclusive federal jurisdiction does not preclude
arbitrability).
224. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 691 (1973), reprinted in 2 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR,
COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY Acr OF 1974, at 1883, 2096 (1976) [hereinafter
LEGIS. HIST.].
225. Section 510 prohibits "any person," not only employers, from discriminating against
participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). In addition, plan administrators may
be subject to another statutory claim - breach of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Acosta v. Pacific
Enters., 950 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991).
226. SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SENATE VERSION AND THE HOUSE VERSION OF H.R. 2 To PROVIDE FOR PENSION REFORM 24 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGIS. HIST.,
supra note 224, at 5249, 5274.
227. See id. at 25, reprinted in 3 LEms. HIST., supra note 224, at 5275; supra notes 38, 6768 and accompanying text.
228. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 42, at 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5108.

230

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 93:193

eligibility for benefits.229 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court concluded
that private arbitration could provide an adequate forum for promoting the "important social policies" served by the antidiscrimination law embodied in the ADEA: "We do not perceive any
inherent inconsistency between those policies . . . and enforcing
' agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. "230 Like the
ADEA at issue in Gilmer, section 510 serves the important social
value of eliminating one category of arbitrary discrimination.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has concluded that commercial arbitration provides an adequate forum for enforcing even claims implicating "important social policies."231
Thus, the text, legislative history, and purposes of ERISA section 510 do not indicate a congressional intent to preclude arbitration. Under the test established by the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi, courts should tlierefore enforce agreements in commercial contracts to arbitrate such claims.
3. Arbitration Pursuant to Individual Employment Contracts
Neither labor arbitration precedent nor commercial arbitration
precedent clearly controls the arbitrability of statutory claims pursuant to individual employment contracts.232 It therefore remains
229. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
230. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
231. 500 U.S. at 28 ("The Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and
the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance important public policies, but • , •
claims under those statutes are appropriate for arbitration.").
232. Gardner-Denver de~ls only with arbitration pursuant to collectively bargained arbitration agreements. Individual employment contracts do not fall within the scope of the
LMRA, and therefore Gardner-Denver's reasoning can apply only by analogy. Mitsubishi,
on the other hand, involves commercial arbitration under the FAA. The FAA may not apply
to arbitration under individual employment contracts because § 1 of the FAA excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Lower courts are divided over the
scope of this exclusion. Some courts read the exclusion quite broadly to exempt all employment contracts from the terms of the FAA. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dictum that "the FAA by its
own terms does not apply to employment contracts"). Other courts read the exclusion much
more narrowly, concluding that it excludes only the contracts of workers engaged in the
transportation industry. See, e.g., Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d
Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue. In Gilmer, the Court avoided
the question by deciding that the securities registration application was not an employment
contract, despite the fact that submitting the application was required as a term of Gilmer's
employment. See 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court today •.. skirts the
antecedent question of whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses
contained in employment contracts, regardless of the subject matter of the claim at issue
••.•"); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vtsion,
1991 J. D1sP. RESoL. 259, 272-79 (arguing that the Gilmer Court opted for a restrictive definition of employment contract in order to avoid confronting the scope of the FAA employment
contract exclusion).
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unclear whether the reasoning of Mitsubishi or of Gardner-Denver
controls the arbitrability of section 510 claims when an arbitration
clause appears in an individual employment contract. Nevertheless,
the principles guiding the Supreme Court in its labor arbitration
cases and its commercial arbitration cases support enforcing arbitration of statutory claims, including those under BRISA section
510, pursuant to individual employment contracts.
Although the Supreme Court has held that claims raising individual statutory rights are not subject to labor arbitration,233 this
conclusion stands as an exception to the general policy of enforcing
agreements to arbitrate. The rationale for the exception derives
from the distinct nature of labor arbitration, which seeks to maintain labor-management relations and avoid strikes.234 This rationale is inapplicable to arbitration pursuant to individual employment
contracts. Arbitration under individual employment contracts
seeks only to resolve a particular dispute between employee and
employer.235 As in the commercial context, arbitration is desirable
in the individual employment context in order to resolve disputes
cheaply and efficiently.236 Arbitration of individual employment
contracts is directed at avoiding the expense of a trial, not the expense of a strike. As such, arbitration of individual employment
contracts parallels commercial arbitration, not labor arbitration.
Arbitration under individual employment contracts also lacks
the "tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights" 237 that precludes labor arbitration of statutory claims.
Although employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement
must rely on a union to pursue arbitration of their grievances,238
nonunionized employees decide for themselves whether to bring a
claim to arbitration. Requiring individual employees to arbitrate
statutory claims does not force them to rely on a union to press
their claims. Thus, the rationale that supports an exception in the
context of labor law to the general rule of enforcing arbitration
agreements is absent in the context of individual employment
contracts.
CONCLUSION

BRISA section 510 provides a judicial remedy for any employee
whose employer discriminated against her to prevent her from obtaining benefits under an employer-sponsored pension or welfare
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra section 111.A.2.
See supra notes 117-22, 151-54 and accompanying text.
See WILNER, supra note 132, § 1.01.
See id.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).

See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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plan. Two private remedies may also be available: remedies
through the plan's appeals procedure and remedies through contract-based arbitration. This Note has examined whether plaintiffs
bringing section 510 claims must first exhaust plan-based or arbitral
remedies before resorting to the federal courts.
Courts should not require section 510 plaintiffs to exhaust plan
procedures before resorting to the courts. Courts generally apply
an exhaµstion requirement in order to resolve the tension between
conflicting congressional messages: providing access to the courts
while at the same time encouraging private dispute resolution. This
tension, however, is absent in the context of section 510 claims.
Nothing in the text or history of BRISA indicates that Congress
sought to encourage the private resolution of discrimination claims
under section 510.
Even if courts conclude that an exhaustion requirement applies
generally to statutory BRISA claims, courts should excuse this requirement for most section 510 claims. Section 510 claims typically
fall within the judicially created exception to exhaustion for futility
because most plan administrators are aligned with employers - the
party accused of discrimination under section 510. In addition, because plan procedures provide only benefits, courts should excuse
the exhaustion of plan remedies requirement for section 510 claims
due to the inadequacy of plan remedies.
Arbitration agreements operate on a different premise from
plan remedies. Potential section 510 plaintiffs may agree to arbitration by contract, whereas they do not necessarily agree upon planbased remedies. Whether courts should require section 510 plaintiffs to exhaust arbitration depends on the type of contract - and
with it the type of arbitration - to which the parties agreed.
Supreme Court labor law decisions indicate that courts should not
require arbitration of section 510 claims pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. The Court has concluded that arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreements cannot resolve statutory
claims involving minimum guarantees to individual employees.
Section 510 claims fall within this category of claims exempt from
labor arbitration.
The Supreme Court, however, has been much more willing to
enforce arbitration of statutory claims pursuant to commercial contracts. The Court has held that, unlike labor arbitration, commercial arbitration provides an adequate forum for resolving statutory
claims unless Congress specifically intended to preclude arbitratiop
of the statutory claim. The text, legislative history, and underlying
purposes of BRISA do not indicate a congressional intent to preclude arbitration of section 510 claims. Courts therefore should enforce arbitral agreements covering section 510 claims.
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The arbitrability of section 510 claims pursuant to individual
employment contracts remains less clear. The Supreme Court has
not determined whether court enforcement of such arbitration
agreements will follow labor arbitration precedent or commercial
arbitration precedent. · Nonetheless, individual employment contracts lack the tension between individual rights and collective representation that precludes labor arbitration of statutory claims.
Courts therefore should enforce arbitration of section 510 claims
pursuant to individual employment contracts.

